Inflation is a fascinating phenomenon from an investment perspective. Naturally most of the focus and analysis comes from the bond markets, where inflation expectations largely guide the movements in bond prices. However should the rest of the investment community analyse inflation expectations in the same way? Moreover, is the focus on headline inflation the key to understanding economic prospects? In this article, I will answer 'no' to both of these questions.
Inflation Policy is Influenced by Historical Events
Political actions or ideologies only really acquire strength if they are accompanied by emotional involvement and, it takes significant macro events in order to get the public involved with the details of economic policy. However, when they happen, the ramifications can become deeply embedded.
In terms of inflation, consider the hyper inflation experienced by the Germans in the inter-war period. This has had a lasting cultural effect on the willingness of Germans to agree to anti-inflationary Governmental measures. Similarly, the inflationary period in the 70's has caused no end of academic spilt ink to be devoted to formulating headline inflation busting policies. Whatever it took, headline inflation had to be controlled.
Moreover, this approach can be seen in the remits of both the ECB and the Federal Reserve. Although the Federal Reserve is supposed to oversee growth and inflation, very few people argue for a focus on the former if it compromises-in the slightest- the latter.
Academic Focus on Inflation
However, the focus on inflation is not just limited to executive political decision making. Indeed, it is fascinating how this is the one area of policy that the free marketeers (Milton Friedman etc) will insist requires action. Friedman's work focused on the control of monetary aggregate growth as the key to beating inflation. Friedrich Hayek has suggested that currencies be allowed to 'compete' with one another, in order to impose an anti-inflationary discipline upon issuers. Most of the economists focusing on this area of research would advocate inflation targeting in order to keep the economy out of recession.
Inflation Induces Misallocations of Capital
However, it is to an earlier insight of Hayek's that I think attention should be focused. In 'The Pure Theory of Capital'. In this early work, Hayek attempts to explain the cyclical nature of industrial output in a systematic theory of capital. He warns of the dangers of misallocations of capital that are caused by the availability of cheap credit during the boom period. The resulting recession is lengthened by the difficulties inherent in restructuring this capital. Furthermore, this 'cheap credit' is induced by rapid relative movements in pricing.
So for example, if house prices are booming-after the dot com bust, housing, commodities and hedge funds became the new 'dot-com'-then credit issuers will be psychologically induced to issue cheap credit. I need not explain the outcome of this and how much misallocated capital was thrown at new house build in the US. Just look at this chart...
The greatest insights into how economic agents are induced into doing this is given in the behavioural finance research of Kahneman and Tversky. They demonstrate how people tend to use heuristics in order to make decisions under uncertainty and, rapidly changing prices (inflation) are a significant cause of uncertainty.
In this article, I am arguing that it is the effects of these misallocations that are the symptoms and the cause is the psychological inducements. However, you can have these misallocations-with significant effects-without having head line inflation.
Inflation without the Inflation?
As noted above, for historical reasons, the focus on fighting inflation has been on the headline numbers. However, it strikes me that recent history has highlighted the dangers of inflation without, err, the inflation! Combating head line inflation is, in my opinion, far too narrow a political course to guide. In the last few years, we have seen inflation in the risk seeking within housing, mortgage bonds, CDO's etc. All of which was watched over by the Federal Reserve.
Indeed, Greenspan spoke of a 'bond conundrum' as he had tried to raise rates only to see the markets keep market rates low. Ultimately, was this a problem to Greenspan, given that his remit is headline inflation? I suspect not, or at least, not enough to propel him to act further. Unfortunately, the inflation remit of the Federal Reserve is set up to fight yesterday's battles.
Similarly, with European Sovereign Debt, the market merrily priced in peripheral debt at close to Bund levels for most of the naughties. The Greeks never had it so good. Again, the subsequent misapplications of capital are being dealt with today. Again, the ECB's inflation busting remit does not allow it to make considerations. Bizarrely of all, the history of Communist control in China has created an environment whereby their central authorities can look at these issues in isolation.
Fighting Inflation in Future
I think a fundamental rethink in inflation targeting is needed. I do not argue for an abandonment of current head line inflation targeting however I do think that policy responses-as with Greenspan and the 'bond conundrum'-should be encumbered because of a narrow focus on inflation targeting. Indeed, Greenspan repeatedly warned of the dangers of derivative issuance. Moreover, Mervyn King has been devastatingly succinct on what he thinks about the banking system.
It's time to rethink Central Banks remits and, to stop forcing them to fight yesterday's battles.
Source:
Hayek, F.A "Denationalization of Money: An Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies" , Hobart Papers, Transatlantic Arts, 1977
Hayek, F.A "The Pure Theory of Capital", The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek, University of Chicago Press, 2007
Kahneman, Daniel and Tversky, Amos "Judgement Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases", Cambridge University Press, 1982
Keeping investors up to date on macro economic affairs, so they can make informed investment decisions. This blog also has a focus on discussing the interaction between macro economics and cultural affairs.
Saturday, January 8, 2011
Saturday, January 1, 2011
More Austerity Measures are Likely in 2011
As we start a new year, I thought it would be interesting to assess the performance of the leading countries in addressing their public deficits. After a 2010 characterized by a European sovereign debt crisis, it is time to think about whether 2011 holds similar prospects.
In summary, I think there are significant issues ahead for Sovereign Debt in 2011. In particular, Spain appears set to follow the path of Greece , Ireland and Portugal . Similarly, I think that the next in line of the major countries is the US and UK . However, those countries are likely to benefit more from a cyclical pick up because their Governments were purchasing assets in the crisis. If growth is stronger than expected than these assets could perform well (or be sold back to the private sector) and their financial situation could be improved.
However, on trend, the US and UK will have to implement more austerity measures. Italy and France will also have to take measures. I am particularly worried about Italy , but I will start by looking at Spain .
According to reports, the ECB has not yet been buying Spanish debt but it has been buying Portuguese and Irish. This is why after the recent ECB action, Portuguese 10 year bond yields are below their November highs…
…but the Spanish 10 year yield is not…
This is a clear indication that the Portuguese bond market is being held by European Stabilization Fund (ESF) buying. It should be noted that, according to the BIS, Spanish banks hold over $108bn worth of Portuguese sovereign debt. Moreover, the market doesn’t seem too keen to insure Spanish debt. See 5 year CDS pricing here…
So what is in store for 2011?
Stabilizing European Deficits?
Not for nothing is Trichet insisting that any usage of the European Stabilisation Fund should be accompanied by implementation of budgetary austerity measures. I wanted to see how this plays out by trying to estimate how much Governments will have to cut back in order to try and stabilise their deficits.
Firstly I've compared current 10 year yields with nominal GDP forecasts and included gross debt as a percentage of GDP. The last two columns are for Government Financial Balances as a share of GDP.
Firstly I've compared current 10 year yields with nominal GDP forecasts and included gross debt as a percentage of GDP. The last two columns are for Government Financial Balances as a share of GDP.
Nominal GDP Growth | Gross Debt % GDP | Gov Fin Balances | |||||
10 Yr Yld | 2011 | 2012 | 2011 | 2012 | 2011 | 2012 | |
Belgium | 3.43% | 3.30% | 3.50% | 104.30% | 105.20% | -4.50% | -3.60% |
France | 3.36% | 2.60% | 3.10% | 97.10% | 100.20% | -6.10% | -4.80% |
Germany | 2.96% | 3.60% | 3.40% | 81.30% | 82.00% | -2.90% | -2.10% |
Greece | 12.47% | -0.30% | 1.50% | 136.80% | 142.20% | -7.60% | -6.50% |
Ireland | 9.06% | 2.20% | 3.70% | 112.70% | 115.60% | -9.50% | -7.40% |
Italy | 4.82% | 2.50% | 2.70% | 132.70% | 133.00% | -3.90% | -3.10% |
Japan | 1.00% | 0.90% | 0.50% | 204.20% | 210.20% | -7.50% | -7.30% |
Portugal | 6.60% | 1.10% | 3.00% | 98.70% | 100.60% | -5.00% | -4.40% |
Spain | 5.45% | 1.10% | 2.10% | 78.20% | 79.60% | -6.30% | -4.40% |
UK | 3.40% | 3.70% | 3.20% | 88.60% | 94.50% | -8.10% | -6.50% |
USA | 3.29% | 3.40% | 4.10% | 98.50% | 101.40% | -8.80% | -6.80% |
The next step is to calculate what these Governments need to do in order to stabilise their debt. I can do this by calculating this number from the following equation
Stabilising deficit= (Debt % GDP *(i-g))/(1+g)
This gives the following results in the second and third columns.
| Stabilising Deficit | Adjustment | |||
| 2011 | 2012 | 2011 | 2012 | |
| Belgium | 0.13% | -0.07% | -4.63% | -3.53% |
| France | 0.72% | 0.25% | -6.82% | -5.05% |
| Germany | -0.50% | -0.35% | -2.40% | -1.75% |
| Greece | 17.52% | 15.37% | -25.12% | -21.87% |
| Ireland | 7.56% | 5.97% | -17.06% | -13.37% |
| Italy | 3.00% | 2.74% | -6.90% | -5.84% |
| Japan | 0.20% | 1.05% | -7.70% | -8.35% |
| Portugal | 5.37% | 3.52% | -10.37% | -7.92% |
| Spain | 3.37% | 2.61% | -9.67% | -7.01% |
| UK | -0.26% | 0.18% | -7.84% | -6.68% |
| USA | -0.10% | -0.79% | -8.70% | -6.01% |
The last two columns (adjustment) are the key to this exercise. So for example, the UK has to cutback 7.84% and 6.68% in 2011 & 2012 respectively from their proposed spending, just in order to stsabilise the debt/GDP ratio. They illustrate how much these Governments need to do in order to stabilize their deficits at the levels they are at now. Of course, they do not necessarily need to do this, but I would hope that they would realize the importance of reducing their overall debt burdens.
Incredibly, given current bond yields, the US, UK and Germany could run slight deficits and still eat away at debt in 2011. However, I would caution that this relationship exists as long as the bond markets have confidence in them.
Frankly, Spain and Portugal are going to have to make more cutbacks. This will be very hard for Spain given that their economy looks weak and their housing market remains a drag on growth. I would expect downwards pressure on their GDP growth numbers. Moreover, if the market continues to doubt them then their debt servicing costs will only increase.
US and UK Debt Positions Helped By Asset Purchases
Turning to the UK and US, they too look like they are going to have to make more cutbacks. However, there is a mitigating circumstance. Going into the financial crisis these two economies had a higher share of GDP in financial services than the others. They ended up buying assets, therefore their net financial position is liable to be positively impacted by growth.
% of 2011 & 2012 GDP | ||||
Gross Financial Liabilities | Net Financial Liabilities | |||
Belgium | 104.3 | 105.2 | 84.2 | 85.0 |
France | 97.1 | 100.2 | 61.8 | 64.7 |
Germany | 81.3 | 82.0 | 51.6 | 52.0 |
Greece | 136.8 | 142.2 | 105.1 | 110.1 |
Ireland | 112.7 | 115.6 | 69.7 | 74.6 |
Italy | 132.7 | 133.0 | 104.7 | 105.0 |
Japan | 204.2 | 210.2 | 120.4 | 127.1 |
Portugal | 66.7 | 67.4 | 67.6 | 70.0 |
Spain | 78.2 | 79.6 | 49.3 | 52.8 |
UK | 88.6 | 94.5 | 57.6 | 62.3 |
USA | 98.5 | 101.4 | 74.3 | 78.2 |
source: OECD Forecasts
Clearly,
The Political and Economic Will for More Bail Outs?
Whether the political and economic will exists for this is another question. The ECB seems keen to talk of defending the Euro and its members’ sovereign debt, but this is likely to be politicking in order to hold up peripheral bond yields. Unfortunately, it’s not working. Moreover the knock on effects of falling Spanish and Portuguese debt (not to mention Italian) could be significant upon the European banking sector.
I’m not long European Banks. Source:
OECD Forecasts
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